How To Get Your Boss To Say Yes To CoSchedule (Powered By Science)

How To Get Your Boss To Say Yes To (Powered By Science) Marketing has  changed more in last few years than in the last half-century before them. And the velocity of change is only accelerating. This means there are more areas than ever we need to be competent in. Not only do we have to be awesome at being visionary leaders, sharp copywriters, email wizards, rockin conversion experts, killer project managers, Ogilvy-esque advertisers, and 48 other skills we have to build the skill of leading change. weve gotta challenge the status quo  before were stuck. even more, weve gotta convince our bosses to come along for the ride. And if youve made the decision to adopt , the worlds best marketing management platform, the task is the same. It all comes down to our ability to influence others. From our peers to the C-Suite execs. But, if youve ever read about the psychology of influence, it can be sad news. Doubly so when it comes to how to convince your boss or top brass to try new tools like . How To Get Your Boss To Say Yes To @(Powered By Science) by @jordan_loftisThe *Semi-Depressing* Reality Of Influencing Others One of the first principles of influence you come across is called the halo effect. In the 1920s, psychologist Edward Thorndike piloted a study of how military officers judge their subordinates. He found more physically attractive soldiers were were rated higher across the board on a four-point scale: intelligence, physique, leadership, and character. This means positive reactions to physical appearance were projected onto other areas of the soldiers. And as much as we hate to admit it, the rabbit hole goes deeper. This principle holds true in elections, as well. In a study called Beauty at the Ballot Box, researchers theorized that since physical attractiveness is a cue toward good health, we may be biologically programmed to esteem it. Meaning were naturally inclined to favor attractive people. However, when it comes to convincing your boss to say yes to a fresh software tool like obliterating makeshift marketing a flexible work-from-home policy that new process weve got many more science-backed levers to pull than just our faces. 4 Ways To Convince Your Boss To Say Yes To Fueled By Science 🚀 In this post, Ill share the best research on ethical approaches to convince your boss to say yes to (and just about anything else!). No makeup required. Youll learn four strategies: How to position your ask in concrete terms, How to align implementing with team objectives, Why to conduct a trial run with a mini post-mortem conversation, And how to win the conversation by starting big, then going small. One of the most powerful benefits of is its ability to crush the bug we call makeshift marketing. A major change to the marketing landscape is the sheer number of single-function software tools available. Unfortunately, most dont play well together. This means were stuck with tools not designed with marketers in mind. This makes your life more frustrating and puts a lid on your results. So, well walk through examples of leading change to combat it by getting your boss to say yes to ! Saddle up, partner! #1: Convince Your Boss To Say Yes To Through Loss Aversion Lets begin with  opportunity cost. An opportunity cost is the benefit someone loses in favor of taking a different action. When you choose between things, you lose the benefits of the alternative choice. With this first tactic, well leverage the principles of loss aversion and prospect theory. Research shows that people fear loss more than they desire benefit. And this greatly influences the way they choose between options (aka: prospects). Research shows that people fear loss more than they desire benefit.This means people will over emphasise even minor opportunities for loss. Nielsen Norman Group  says it like this: When choosing among several alternatives, people avoid losses and optimize for sure wins because the pain of losing is greater than the satisfaction of an equivalent gain. For example, you want to adopt a new marketing tool  like to replace a less effective one (or even multiple tools). The problem is theres a chance the new tool will cost more than its worth. Either in hard cash  and  in lost productivity. In turn, your boss may be instantly loss averse. This will impact her choice between the prospects of status quo and potential loss. The risk may seem falsely outsized - especially if budgets or time are already tight. To use this knowledge to your advantage, simply structure your ask in two parts: If we do [thing you want] it will add [positive value]. If we dont do [thing you want] it will cost [negative value]. In this case, it may sound like: If we [adopt ], it will give us a [55% lift in productivity per team member]. If we dont [adopt this new tool], we are actually losing [$1,255 per week in lost productivity]. To help you make that case, you can actually use the nifty Time Savings Calculator we built. After extensive research of our customers, we found the average time savings based on the above criteria. Simply enter your team size, the number of projects you complete each week, and the number of social profiles you manage. Then click Calculate Time Savings. In this case, a team of two completing four projects and managing three social media profiles per week can save over 20 hours per month! (Whats even cooler is  this actually happened for customer Florida Realtors ®) If you dollarize your time, thats an incredible amount of money. Ask your boss: What would it mean for us to have 80 hours back per month? The idea here is to highlight the gain as specifically as possible. Then showcase the loss of the alternative option - in this case changing nothing - as specifically as possible. This way, you can position the facts according to the emotional principles at play. If your boss says no to , theyre actually saying no to 80 bonus hours per month (on average)! Set the stakes,  make loss aversion your friend, and get to yes faster. Thanks science! #2: Convince Your Boss To Use By Aligning Change With Team Goals Next, marketers have #goalsfordays A recent study we conducted found that marketers who set goals are 429% more likely to be successful. Tactic number two is using this stat to your advantage. If you have goals, like driving  500 fresh leads every month make us of  alignment theory. In simple terms, it says the most successful people understand their strengths and then arrange their lives in alignment with them. This theory works for both individuals and teams. Successful organizations run like machines using this principle. And the power of alignment is possible when strategy, goals, and purpose mutually reinforce one another. To put it to work with your boss, structure your ask for change like this: Our team is trying to achieve [goal]. But we have [failed] for the past [timeframe]. I think the best way we can do this right now is by [thing you want]  [based on prior success]. In keeping with our 1,000 qualified leads example, the ask might be: Our team is trying to achieve [1,000 qualified leads every month]. But weve [only reached 70% of that goal] for the [past three months]. I think the best way we can do this right now is by [focusing exclusively on driving traffic] [to our top-performing landing pages]. The change youre after is a shifted focus: driving more traffic. However, the goal youre trying to achieve is the same: 1,000 qualified leads. Also notice this clause: based on prior success. If your team has had any related successes in the past, highlight them for leverage as proof.If your team has related successes in the past, highlight them for leverage as proof. In this example, it was top-performing landing pages. In their fantastic book, Switch, authors Chip and Dan Heath call these prior wins bright spots. Theyre powerful because they showcase that positive results  are possible, because you have achieved them in the past. Youre team is capable of knocking it outta the park. So, you align your methods accordingly. Bonus: This is also a great chance to sharpen your goal-setting strategy if it needs a little work. #3: Convince Your Boss To Say Yes To With A Post-Mortem Post-mortems sound sad but can I be real for a minute? I think theyre amazing. Post-mortems are amazing persuasion hacks.A post-mortem is an analysis held after a project, usually with the aim of answering this question: How on earth did things go so wrong?! So why do I love em? Because theyre amazing chances to learn. Theyre even beneficial to hold on the heels of successful projects. They promote healthy self-reflection and can benefit your entire team. To persuade your boss to say yes to , though, I want you to tactically use a mini post-mortem with your boss in advance of your ask. Two reasons: You can learn why similar changes, like adopting new tools, have failed in the past. You can pre-empt legitimate objections your boss will have ahead of time. Why Have Other Things Failed? By learning why other initiatives have failed, you can learn what pitfalls to avoid. For instance, if youre proposing a move from messy-as-hell spreadsheets to   - or a similar transition from an inefficient way of doing things - how helpful would it be to learn that the last tool transition to be shot down actually had the support of your manager, but got squashed by the CFO? Setup this convo like this: When was the last time we wanted to get budget for a new software tool in our department? How did it go? If the last attempt bombed, follow with, Why do you think it failed? And is there any way it could have been approved? If it succeeded, even better! Ask, Why was it successful? And how has it panned out? Overcoming Legitimate Objections Next, you can glean what legitimate objections your boss may have to your idea. Almost every boss Ive ever had loved to say, Yes! to great ideas. But so many of my attempts at leading a new change as the underling failed because I didnt understand their field of visibility. Field of visibility means their viewpoint informed by the things they know that you may not. Think of it like this. Company execs sit in meetings that you dont. They hear forecasts, plans, and upcoming constraints that you dont. They understand organizational dynamics you may have missed. They see your team from a broader perspective than you might. This means understanding their field of visibility is incredibly beneficial. With a mini post-mortem, you can dig in to why a similar change failed. This will help you position your ask to overcome your bosss legitimate (or even illegitimate) objections. Whether its data Or a project champion up the chain Or even competitive research You can gain insight beforehand to have great answers to tough questions. And these answers can fuel your case for adopting ! #4: Convince Your Boss By Asking Big, Then Small Last, lets talk about an old psychological warhorse: the rule of reciprocity. Psychologist and best-selling author Robert Cialdini explains it in his book,  Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion, like this. He writes: The rule says that we should try to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us [and] by virtue of the reciprocity rulewe are  obligated to the future repayment of favors, gifts, invitations, and the like. The idea is to do something for someone else  before you ask them to do something for you. When you do so, youre far more likely to get your Yes. While this principle might be effective, its often felt too manipulative for me to entertain actually doing this. You can influence people without being conniving or manipulative.Call me a boy scout, but that seems like a pretty sketchy move. And worse, an infringement on a healthy relationship. That said, there is a version of this rule I happily endorse 😎 Cialdini also shares a specific application of this rule called bargaining, saying, Bargaining is frequently used in the negotiation process, which involves reciprocal concessions. That is, if Person A rebuffs a large request from Person B, and Person B then concedes by making a smaller request, Person A will feel obligated to reciprocate this concession with a concession of his or her own by agreeing to this lesser plea. In 1975, researchers on the Arizona State University campus cracked the code on this. In an experiment, half of the students in the test were asked, Will you chaperone juvenile-detention-center inmates on a day trip to the zoo? A measly 17% said yes. The other half of the test subjects were asked a leading question first: Will you volunteer as a juvenile-detention-center counselor for two hours per week for the next two years? Every single student said no to the new leading question but then the interesting part happened. Nearly 50% said yes to the second (original) question about chaperoning the zoo visit! The angle for our marketing purposes is pretty obvious: construct two versions of your ask.

At-risk students attitudes toward schooling as related to achievement, Essay

At-risk students attitudes toward schooling as related to achievement, attendance and bahavior - Essay Example ed on the SAAS-R that records students attitudes about feelings about school, teacher relationships, the ability to do well in school, the potential for good grades and engagement in school activities and actual academic achievement, as defined by performance on the Kentucky K-Prep instrument. The study will also measure the relationship between student feelings about self and school and other non-academic factors, such as attendance and the number over recorded behavioral infractions. The academic success of a student depends on numerous positive and negative factors. An overabundance of negative factors present in a student’s life may place them at-risk for facing a number of difficulties such as academic failure, withdrawing from school, and exhibiting certain behavioral problems that my result in a lower quality of home and school life. These risk factors can include ethnic or minority status, low socio-economic standing, and family level of education attainment. Another significant risk factor involves whether or not the student exhibits any physical, behavioral, or emotional disabilities. All of these dynamics may combine to compromise the student’s chances of receiving a quality education in a free and public school. It is also important to consider other potential barriers to academic achievement. The risk factors here involve a student’s lack of motivation, self-perception, and the interaction that takes place between teachers and other school staff. Rollins and Valdez (2006) found that student perceptions of how they will perform in school determine their academic success. Perception is defined to include all processes associated with the recognition, transformation, and organization of sensory information (Little, 1999). The perception theory defines perception as images that exist where and when the mind perceives them (Carr, 1918). Carr proposed that images are not the whole reality of what is seen, but reality is duration, and the

Bussiness Ethics Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2250 words

Bussiness Ethics - Essay Example Although, some manufacturers made deliveries to IKEA, mostly at night to avoid being seen, IKEA thought of other strategic options to counter this problem, and one among them is outsourcing. This made IKEA to go scouting abroad for manufacturers and Kamprad entered into contracts with number of factories in Poland, thus ‘seeding’ more outsourcing. It was this early decision of Kamprad to seek least expensive alternatives to domestic manufacturing of the products turned out to be a more profitable avenue for IKEA to take. As, this outsourcing strategy reduced the costs of production, it is able to offer affordable or cheap prices to the customer, thereby bringing in more customers. â€Å"IKEA currently works with 1,300 suppliers in 53 countries, but Kamprad made the pioneering decision to source furniture from communist Poland as early as 1961. Since manufacturing costs were 50% lower in Poland than in Sweden, his decision looks brilliant in hindsight.† (Barthelemy 2006). Importantly, IKEA continued as well as extended its outsourcing strategy to other countries particularly 1980’s and 90’s, particularly to Asian countries like India, Ch ina, Pakistan, Philippines, etc, where they can access cheap labour. Although, outsourcing to these countries gave IKEA a cost-effective option, it also led to the rise of ethical issues and controversies, both from the economic as well as political perspectives, thereby making or even forcing IKEA to come up with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) based activities. IKEA outsourced to the Asian countries many of its manufacturing processes including making of carpet, rugs, wicker baskets, etc. That is, in starting from 1970s and more prominently from 1990’s, they found many local manufacturers cum suppliers, who would manufacture the products and supply to them with IKEA label. This turned out to be a productive and profitable option, as IKEA was able to get good productivity for cheaper prices, when compared to the

Different Moral Standards Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2250 words

Different Moral Standards - Essay Example They took advantage of the changing social norms and values. Since women were entering employment, they believed that they could sell packaged food very well. GMC was concerned only with increasing profits and this was communicated to the Pillsbury-Green Giant Group. Green Giant would have to relocate to Mexico in order to ensure profits. Pillsbury accepted the deal against a payment. In this case, the moral standards of three groups differ with each other and the fourth to be considered is that of the local people of Mexico. It is difficult for Green Giant not to take any action because of remaining passive they would be harming the interests of the stakeholders. The conflict has to be understood and resolved by all parties involved. The goal of GMC was profiting no matter how it was achieved. They were least concerned if the personal values of any group would have to be compromised with. They valued profits and they could apply the management style of ‘light but firm hand on the throat’ to achieve this end. Using this style would not make them feel guilty of committing a wrong. This clearly demonstrates that they give priority to profits over any other values. The goals of Giant Green had to undergo a change to swim along with the demands of the new company. The cultural and religious traditions of both the groups differ which affects the decision making process. GMC is a British company while Green Giant has its roots in Minnesota and California. Since the economic situation of GMC had deteriorated, they were willing to compromise on their values as this gained priority. Thus an ethical solution becomes imperative which causes the least harm and maximum good to the different groups of people involved in this case. The goal of Green Giant-Pillsbury was to maximize profits but their norms differed. The values of the executives of the Pillsbury group differed from the GMC.  

History of Nationalism in Israel

History of Nationalism in Israel Promised Land, Crusader State: The Rise, Fall and Return of the Covenant Nation A dissertation submitted by 58126 to the Department of Government, the London School of Economics and Political Science, in part completion of the requirements for the MSc in Comparative Politics (Conflict Studies) September 1st, 2008 Word Count: ABSTRACT Several prominent comparativists claim that Israel is an outlier case a unique case study that generally defies most conventional forms of categorization. Such an allegation naturally assumes Israel to be exceptional and its behavior inexplicable. The assumption of Israels uniqueness was born during the marked epistemological shift from behavioral crossnational inquiries to more contextually and historically-derived theories, and has undermined Israels place in comparative politics. This dissertation seeks to place Israel and its behavior squarely back into the mix and up against much of the same scrutiny faced by other nation-states. By shifting again from a contextually and historically-derived theory of nationalism towards a more cognitive and tradition-based approach, centered on the ethno-symbolic approach professed by Anthony D. Smith and John Hutchinson, elements of Israels nationalism and national identity are analyzed as contributing to its existence as a zone of conflict a nd to its violent behavior. An analysis of the Covenant Nation as a new comparative category that presupposes the idea of; (i) a chosen people, in (ii) a Promised Land, that uses (iii) blood sacrifice in order to fulfill a redemptive destiny and a commitment to worldly salvation, is highlighted. Limited comparisons to other covenant nations are drawn where applicable. Introduction: Since 1948, Israel has been regarded by some as an occupying force in the Middle East. That Israel, and Jews in general, could be a conquering and occupying people given their fate in the first half of the twentieth century as a nation without a home, victims of anti-Semitism and persecution is confusing to many. For reasons such as this, Israel has long been considered an outlier case by political scientists (Barnett 1996, ch.1). To the point of emphasis, it is argued that Israel defies most categorization, which has become the methodology employed by comparativists in order to understand states and state behavior. Categorizing usually requires classifying a case study under dichotic, or opposite, adjectives; Israel being neither East nor West, developed nor underdeveloped, capitalist nor socialist, Third World nor First World therefore, becomes difficult to study (Barnett 1996, 7). Furthermore, Israel has routinely been excluded from geographically specific studies or regional studies, since it is often considered an alien entity in the Middle East. However, despite Israels historical particularity, Israel is not an alien entity in the Middle East and its behavior is not inexplicable. While differences certainly exist categorically between Israel and other states, they both nevertheless share many of the same traits and concerns characteristics that might have similar origins. It will be argued that in order to understand Israel, both as a nation-state and as it behaves, one needs to understand Israeli nationalist sentiments. Nationalism in itself is a difficult thing to define. Where does it come from? What does it entail? How deeply is it entrenched? The answers to these questions, and many like them, could explain why a nation-state behaves in the way that it does. There are two major competing schools of thought when it comes to understanding nationalism, (a) the modernists, and (b) the primordialists. The modernists would date nationalism to industrialism, the development of capitalism, or to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The primordialists, on the other hand, see nationalism as dating back much farther possibly to even before history was recorded. Under this train of thought, Israel might date its nationalism back to the Hebrew Bible. Essentially, it all depends on where in history one chooses to draw the line. This paper will primarily argue that in order to understand Israel as an inherently violent and conflict-laden nation-state it is necessary to move away from the established contextually-derived theories of nationalism and move to one that is more cognitively based. In so doing, this paper will show that Israel is in fact a state like all others. It is not an anomaly, nor methodologically suspect its behavior not inexplicable. Regardless of its ancient historic roots, and despite its recent induction as a state among the family of nations, Israels nationalism should not be analyzed according to the dates of its borders, citizens, infrastructure, or institutions. In a more cognitive approach, Israels nationalism should be understood by the borders, beliefs and people themselves. As such, it will be shown that Israel is the archetypical Covenant Nation a category that exists free from both time and space. Such a theory of nationalism can thus draw on elements from either modern or pr e-modern periods/approaches and need not be based on regional developments or similarities. Israel, like all covenant nations, is inherently conflict-laden. As will be laid out in much greater detail, covenant nations have a strategic culture born of three identifying features/beliefs that make them violent and militaristic in nature. Covenant nations are under a seemingly contractual obligation to defend and secure the idea of; (i) a chosen people, in (ii) a Promised Land, using (iii) blood sacrifice. When the covenant nation theory is highlighted as the root cause of violence, it becomes clear that a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict becomes much more difficult to ascertain. Conflict becomes unrelated to geopolitical realities or existing/imagined security dilemmas, but to an embedded sense of national superiority, a contractual obligation to fulfill the prophecy of the covenant and, derivatively, a commitment to worldly salvation. Thus, while many scholars claim Israel is an outlier case like no other, they are wrong from the outset by trying to assign Israel to conventional and contextual comparativist categories. Israel and its behavior can and should be understood much the same as other states as reactive to its nationalist sentiments, wherever derived. As will be shown, Israel has always been a conquering and occupying nation. It was true of Israels ancient past, it is true of its present and unless a drastic change occurs deep within the embedded (and sacred) structure of Zionism, it will be true of its distant future. The Nation General Definitions and Theories Quest ce-quune nation? Renans question still echoes after more than a century. In recent decades throughout the historical milieu referred to as the post-colonial era a copious amount of interest and attention has been dedicated to the study of nationalism. While no singular definition is agreed on by scholars, for the purpose of this paper a nation will be defined generally as a group that defines itself or is defined by others as sharing common descent and culture [] that also has political consciousness, claiming collective political rights in a given territory (Mann 2005, 11). A nation-state can thus be defined as an entity wherein a nation has its own sovereign state, situated within enunciated and politically defined territorial borders be they universally recognized or not. Scholars of various disciplines have attempted to provide an explanation for the rise, meaning and development of nationalism in human history and societies. The phenomenon of the constitution of nations and national identities, the emergence of national sentiments, the construction of nationhood and nationalist ideologies, appear to all be interrelated constituents of a single phenomenon. Nevertheless, competing theories of nationalism exist the major schism existing between modernists and primordialists. Modernists, such as Gellner and Anderson, assume that the origins of nations and nationalism lie in the structural changes that affected economic and social systems during the industrial revolution at the end of the eighteenth century (Gellner 2006, 48-49), implicitly denying cultural factors. In the opinion of the modernists, the introduction of new means of production and the division of labor caused a restructuring of social relations and the polarization of class interests. Nationalism emerged as a means to promote and direct change through the creation of a popular solidarity as well as a means to protect and promote class interests (Anderson 1991, 113-114). The prevalence of one intention over another brings about the constitution of different political organizations depending on the nature the political system. So to speak, nationalism is identified by the modernists with the process of nation-building a nation being a mere artificial construction fuelled by class interests. The primordialist notion of nationalism contrasts with that proposed by the modernists. Scholars such as Hastings, Smith and Geertz, believe that nations are natural givens (Hastings 1997, 5). Consequently, it is possible to find traces of nationalism and nationhood in ancient times. The feeling of belonging, the acknowledgement among a group of people sharing common cultural, racial, linguistic traits, a common ancestry, history or religion, is a documented fact in history (Smith 1994, 40). Groups tended to bind together by these ties. The proclivity to coalesce around these shared traits, or focal points, brought about the rise of politically and socially organized nations claiming sovereignty over a territory. In fact, it is Anthony D. Smiths many contributions to the theory of ethnosymbolism in particular that figure most prominently in a discussion of Israeli nationalism, and upon which I have based my initial observations and thesis. Ethnosymbolism is founded on the historical origins of nations particularly to their roots in premodern times and focuses its attention on perceptions, beliefs, symbols, rituals, and shared myths and memories. Although the ethnosymbolic approach focuses on subjective cultural and symbolic rudiments, their long term patterning produces a structure of relations and processes [] which can provide a framework for the socialization of successive generations of ethnic and national members (Smith 1999, 14). In more basic terms, the origin and descent of the community are recollected and transmitted to new members of the group by memory as interpreted by earlier generations. This subjective version of a nations origins is understood through ethnohistory rather t han any official historians lens (Coughlan 2001, 160). Before turning to the difference between history and historical traditions on Israeli national identity and behavior in the following section, allow me to first part ways with Anthony D. Smith and highlight our major difference. In War and Ethnicity: the Role of Warfare in the Formation, Self-Images and Cohesion of Ethnic Identities, Smith argues in sum that war has been a powerful factor in shaping certain crucial aspects of ethnic communities and nationhood. He points to Georg Simmels cohesion thesis, which asserts that external armed conflict or the imminent threat thereof produces all internal group solidarity (Smith 1981, XX). In so doing, Smith turns war and its variations into an independent variable that moulds the ethnic community, and invariably the nation. Though I do agree that war and conflict certainly have the ability to accentuate and exacerbate group identity and cohesion, I contend to the contrary that group cohesion is the primary cause of war and conflict. As su ch, war is the dependent variable that finds its existence and explanation in the more common group aggression theory. Thus, it is not war that creates a sense of belonging and community, but a sense of community and belonging that leads to war and conflict and the sense of belonging and community within the Covenant Nation typifies that. The Rise of the Nation-State: Context vs. Cognition To suggest that Israel is in fact an inherently violent nation-state on account of the Covenant, it is necessary to first dispel the myth that all nation-states are violent, and to trace Israels legacy back beyond its establishment. A long-standing assumption among several prominent political theorists suggests that all nation-states are inherently violent because they are forged in warfare. Richard Bean, in War and the Nation State, argues that beginning in the fourteenth century changes in the art of war inextricably led to the rise of centralized states for the purpose of raising taxes (Bean 1973, 220). It is possible, however, that the nation-state by general concept, if not by definition predates medieval changes in the art of war, and certainly Westphalia. Greek city-states, like Sparta, can be seen as examples of very homogeneous societies with developed political structures, taxation, and mutual obligations between government and citizens. Regardless, ancient historical cas es such as these would likely only serve to highlight the linkage between warfare and the birth of the nation-state. On the other end of the spectrum, what can be said about nation-states that have emerged contemporarily? Taking Israel as an example, a state that came into being by means of a vote in the United Nations, it is easy to suggest that the Arab-Israeli wars following its establishment have played a prominent role in the shaping of modern-day Israel. However, shaping by definition is not synonymous with forging. In the first instance, it is my intention to show that nation-states are not forged explicitly in warfare, but on traditions of warfare wherever derived. The purpose is to rephrase the hypothesis that nation-states are forged in warfare into one more universally applicable. For this, it is necessary to first presume that the nation, with its sense of community and belonging, existed prior. It will be shown that; from (i) a nations strategic culture, come (ii) traditions of warfare, which (iii) lead to a greater sense of national identity, on which (iv) nation-states have been forged. In so doing, I move the discourse away from a contextually derived theory of nationalism to a more cognitive-based approach, in which Anthony D. Smiths contributions to ethnosymbolism (as outlined above) figure prominently. A nation-states strategic culture is the obvious place to look for evidence of a war-born society. Strategic culture is defined by Alistair Iain Johnston as an ideational milieu which limits behavior choices. This milieu consists of shared assumption and decision rules that impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political environment (Johnston 1995, 34). Essentially, it all comes down to security. A strategic culture is shaped from a shared sense of self-perception and threat perception of a specific group of people. It is necessary to assume that if a national group has a strong historical sense of war, aggressiveness, victimization, and/or persecution, that these sentiments would play out in their strategic culture, and would limit behavior choice and influence decision-making. Once forged into nation-states these strategic cultures continue to exist, and therefore become good indicators of how groups vi ew warfare and how their states came into being. In order to analyze a nation-states strategic culture properly, it is important to consider that the study of strategic culture itself has two distinct epistemological approaches context and cognition. Those that believe a strategic culture is based in context would claim that the historical record of the nation, even before its conception as a nation-state, is important to study. Basically, the nation-state expresses its national identity based on its national character. Therefore, a states strategic culture is based on its past it is path dependent. On the other hand, cognitivists see strategic culture as an integrated system of symbols (Johnston 1995, 35). Included in this integrated system of symbols are structures, languages, analogies, myths, metaphors, etc. In this approach national identity, as related to strategic culture, is more easily discernable through the study of a nation-states wartime symbols than a nation states wartime history. Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle, in their book Blood Sacrifice and the Nation, also argue that symbols (like a flag) can be very telling indicators that lead one to uncover the nature of nationalism that exists within a state. In Fallen Soldiers, George Mosse looks to nation-states war memorials: cemeteries, songs, poems and commemorations, for clues. Essentially, a nations sentiments regarding warfare might differ from its experience; they might have been shaped or molded. When trying to find the link between the birth of a nation-state and warfare, symbols offer yet another variable to consider. Due to the fact that there are two different ways to approach the study of strategic culture, and by association an element of a nation-states national identity, a clear distinction can be made between proper warfare and traditions of warfare. Traditions, like symbols, need not be based on truth or historical accuracy. There is a tradition of Santa Clause bringing presents to nice children despite there being no assumption of truth behind such a practice and certainly no historical record to legitimize it. Traditions are sometimes developed more because they serve a purpose, than because they truly commemorate something. When considering nation-state formation it is important to properly choose which traditions are worth investigating. Relating to strategic culture, or any issue that shapes a nation-states identity, it is important that a tradition have; (i) solid national support, (ii) outlived the era that gave it birth, (iii) entered the permanent lexicon of national discourse, and (iv) continued to resonate with a portion of public opinion even at a time when it was not directly affecting public policy (McDougall, Ch.1). As will be shown with the case of Israel, traditions of warfare that have passed the scrutiny of the limitations listed above have played a role in developing national identity, and ultimately forging a nation-state. Modern day Israel is a good example of a nation-state forged on traditions of warfare, and not explicitly in warfare. As suggested above the first place to look for evidence of the link between warfare and state formation would be in a nation-states strategic culture. Israels strategic culture has long been dominated by the realist tradition (Dowty 1998, 84). The realist view of security has solid national support in Israel, it has outlived the era that gave it birth, it has entered the permanent lexicon of national discourse, and even during times of relative peace it continues to resonate with a portion of public opinion. Israels strategic culture is not only realist with regards to self-defense, but also in its offense. The leftist scholars who would date Zionism to Theodor Herzls avowedly socialist ideals of establishing a free, humanitarian and egalitarian state in the Jewish homeland to escape the increasing anti-Semitism of late-nineteenth century Europe (Avineri, 1981, 88-89) are shortsighted in their efforts. There is no such thing as nineteenth and twentieth century Zionism it is only Zionism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The bleak and destructive history of the Jews in Europe plays little significance in Israeli mamlachtiyut, or statism. The traditions that have forged the Israeli nation-state and limit its behavior choices can and should be dated back to the Hebrew Bible. For example, one might choose to examine the myth of the Covenant Nation, and how that played out during the Hebrews first experiment with forging a state following Joshuas invasion of Canaan, as evidence. The invasion represents a realist tradition of conquering and occupying. Whether or not the Hebrew Bible represents an accurate historical rendition or whether it has any academic merit at all is outside the scope of discussion. After all, when providing an account for Israels strategic culture, the scriptures can be analyzed as being contextually historical or as a symbol of cognition. Either way fact or fiction they provide a tradition from which to inherit a strategic culture from, and on which to forge a nation-state. Thus, the argument that Richard Bean makes; that nation-states developed out of the need for a strong central authority to levy taxes due to changes in the art of war, is unconvincing. To the point of emphasis, most modern economic-dependent nationalist arguments are limited when one considers ancient examples of national groups coming together to forge polities within defined and enunciated borders. Cases such as these simply highlight the fact that the forging of a nation-state draws more on myths, sentiments and symbols of collective fear, threat, pride, angst, aspiration, victimization, xenophobia and so forth when grouping together to organize politically. The above sentiments combine to form a strategic culture, from which traditions, national identity and greater cohesiveness are born. The nation-state was born as a response to a need for security; the traditions that transmit that feeling be they contextually or cognitively derived are what inevitably forge nation-states an d determine how violently they will behave. Though it may be true that many nation-states are forged explicitly in warfare (and are established using means of warfare), it is not a universal truth. Instead, it should be argued that nation-states are forged on traditions of warfare traditions that once were prescriptive and later become predictive. Covenant Nations As mentioned above, a strategic culture is shaped from a shared sense of self-perception and threat perception of a specific group of people. It is my assertion (to the contrary of international relations theorists) that Israels strategic culture has nothing to do with threat perception; geopolitical realities and security dilemmas are but moot points. Israel has adopted and further developed a strategic culture based solely on a particular tradition of self-perception that of the Covenant Nation. Defining the term Covenant Nation is not as simple as it may appear; its definition is hard to come by because it involves describing a process more than an entity. Simply put, the covenant is a tradition of ethnic election. The process of ethnic election is a multi-staged process requiring; (i) a sense of being singled out or chosen for a special purpose, (ii) a divine promise whether absolute or conditional made to the chosen people, and (iii) a belief that fulfillment of the covenant leads to worldly salvation (Smith 2003, 48-49). In short, the covenant is a tradition of a contractual agreement between God and His people. Simply put, the Covenant Nation, therefore, is the nation that enters and embodies the covenant. As stated above, traditions need not be based on historical truth or reality; in the ethnosymbolic approach traditions, myths and metaphors offer much the same credence to a debate on nationalism and national identity and thus can serve as an explanation for how nation-states behave. Let me begin by acknowledging that although the term Covenant Nation is rife with religious connotation, I do not intentionally seek to obscure the already blurred lines between religion and nationalism. In fact, I seek to avoid entering the scholarly debate about their ambivalent relationship entirely; I steer clear from scholars like Mark Juergensmeyer, whose work albeit fascinating seeks to compare and contrast the two phenomena and chart their historical interplay (Juergensmeyer 2006, 182). Instead, I point to a recent trend in thinking that sees nationalism itself as a form of belief-system or as a new religion of the people (Smith 2003, 42). George Mosse, in Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, discusses how during the interwar period in Europe a civic religion of nationalism was born based on the cult of the fallen soldier (Mosse 1990, 104). If in Germany, for example, a civic religion of nationalism was born based on the cult of the fallen soldier, it c an be said that for Israel a civic religion of nationalism is born based on the cult of the chosen people and the cult of the Promised Land. The Covenant has always been the cornerstone of Israels national identity dating back to primordial times. The Hebrew Bible first marks the covenant that God makes with Abram in Genesis 12:2: I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you. It is important to note that this verse not only represents the birth of the covenant, but at the same time the birth of the nation highlighting their interconnectedness. The nation and the covenant are thus co-determining and mutually implicating; the two entities are defined by their internal relationship, such that the two entities derive their meaning through their relationship and have no meaning or basis without the other. No reason is given as to why Abram (later Abraham) is selected to head the nation that will come to be known as the chosen people, but we are told that his progeny shall; (i) inherit the land of Canaan, and (ii) outnumber the dust of the earth (Gen. 12:7 and 13:6) outlining the divine promise. In return the covenant nation is obliged to circumcise their children (Gen. 17:7-10) and post-exodus to keep the laws and commandments that God gives unto his chosen people, the holy nation, at Mount Sinai (Exod. 19:4-6). Such are the terms of the covenantal contract; if the Chosen People follow Yahwehs rules, he will give them virtue, peace and prosperity [in the Promised Land]. If they are his holy servants, the scriptures say, he will bless them (Akenson 1992, 16). Furthermore, not only do Gods chosen people benefit from fulfillment of the covenant the whole world does. By fulfilling the covenant it is believed that Gods plan of salvation is advanced; so to speak, the salvation of all hinge[s] on the conduct of a special few (Smith 2003, 51). Therefore, it is to the conduct of the special few that we now shift our attention. If the renowned modernist scholar on nationalism Elie Kedourie is correct when he asserts that nationalism produces a kind of religious fanaticism that lends to conflict (Kedourie 1971, XX), the same must certainly hold true of covenantal nationalism and likely to an even greater degree. As stated earlier, covenant nations come under a seemingly contractual obligation to defend and secure the idea of; (i) a chosen people, in (ii) a Promised Land, using (iii) regular blood sacrifice. Furthermore, the fulfillment of the covenant sets the chosen people apart from other peoples both ethically and ritually: Ye shall be holy; for I the Lord your God am holy (Lev. 19:2). If fulfillment of the covenant that is following the laws and commandments within the Promised Land makes one holy and will lead to worldly salvation for all, than any/all efforts to attain that credo become morally indisputable. A self-r ighteous and realist strategic culture develops whereby any actions taken in fulfillment of the covenant become necessary, justified and self-vindicating. The strategic culture associated with the covenant has thus permeated throughout time in much the same way it was born manifested from a belief in choseness, holiness, and obligation. The Jewish nation has always found its grounding in the covenant whether in the times of Elijah or Hezekiah, Josiah or Nehemiah, the Maccabees or the Talmudic Sages [] all of these looked back to the founding charter of the covenant, not just as legitimation but as the grounding for their conception of the community of Israel and the unity of the Jewish people, which they sought to restore or deepen (Smith 2003, 63). It is on this sacred foundation that modern day Israel was also established. Nineteenth century political Zionism can be broken down into three competing schools of thought; (i) the Revisionist Zionists, (ii) the Labor Zionists, and (iii) the Religious Zionists. In many ways revisionist Zionism epitomizes what it means to be a covenant nation. Vladimir Zeev Jabotinsky, the founder of revisionist Zionism, believed that people are naturally born into nations and inherit its cultures and values. So to speak, individuals have very little choice regarding which nationalities they belong to. It was Jabotinskys belief that the Jews represent a particularly strong nation because despite the pressures of the Diaspora they always maintained their originality and distinctness(Dowty, 37). Furthermore, he insisted that the Jewish state be established in Palestine and trans-Jordan because it was the historical legacy of the Jews. On the other hand, Labor Zionism the most influential branch of Zionism at the time considered itself to be totally secular in nature. Aaron David Gordon, founder of Hapoel Hatzair, saw the Jewish life in the Diaspora as dependence and a lack of self-reliance. Building on German-Jewish philosopher Martin Bubers I and Thou, he sought to create a new covenant by reconnecting with the land using the religion of labor (Dowty, 39), and by replacing the old exiled Jew with a new self-reliant Jew. However, under the secular garb of Labor Zionism the language and intent of the original Abrahamic Covenant can be discerned (Smith 2003, 93). Ber Borochov, ideological founder of the Poalei Zion labor movement wrote that class struggles exist within national groups as well as between them, clearly acknowledging a difference between the Jewish nation and other peoples, and advocating an ethnic nationalism, rather than the more open and tolerant civic kind (Howe 2000, 236). For reasons such as th is he sought to establish a Jewish socialist state. It is important to note, however, that not any state would do for Labor Zionists the state was to be established in the Jewish homeland. To the point of emphasis, upon establishment of the state of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, the first Labor Prime Minister of Israel declared the uniqueness of the Hebrew people and the redemptive destiny of Israel on its own soil (Smith 2003, 92-93). In so doing he acknowledged Labor and Religious Zionism to be not only compatible, but complimentary. Religious Zionism was headed by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook. While it is the usual view that Zionism is a sin and alien culture, a non-Jewish way of life, and that Jews should only return to the Promised Land after messianic redemption, Kook claimed that enhancing attachment to the land is an obligation (Dowty, 44). Essentially, Kook is advocating preparing the land for redemption and salvation and suggests that the secular Zionists are doing holy work by settling the Promised Land. Clearly in all three branches of Zionism the tradition of the covenant remains critical the four deep seated cultural resources that define the covenant nation, namely; community, territory, history and destiny, permeate all of their raisons dà ªtre. By 1948, the underlying dimensions of the covenant nation return to fruition and again form a unifying and legitimizing tradition like in times past. From this tradition a realist strategic culture was born that has; (i) solid national support, (ii) outlived the era that gave it birth, (iii) entered the permanent lexicon of national discourse, and (iv) continued to resonate with a portion of public opinion even during times of relative peace. Biblically, historically and contemporarily time and again the covenant h

Kant and Morality Essay -- the categorical imperative

Kant had a different ethical system which was based on reason. According to Kant reason was the fundamental authority in determining morality. All humans possess the ability to reason, and out of this ability comes two basic commands: the hypothetical imperative and the categorical imperative. In focusing on the categorical imperative, in this essay I will reveal the underlying relationship between reason and duty. The categorical imperative suggests that a course of action must be followed because of its rightness and necessity. The course of action taken can also be reasoned by its ability to be seen as a universal law. Universal laws have been deemed as unconditional commands that are binding to everyone at all times. Kant believed that individuals have a freedom to consciously obey the laws of the universe as they are revealed in accordance to our ability to reason. Kant goes a step further to suggest that our actions should be driven by a sense of duty that is dictated by reason. What does it mean to act out of duty? Kant says that this means that we should act out of respect for the moral law. The moral law can be directly related to the categorical imperative. How can we accomplish the task of acting out of duty? We must first recognize and have an understanding of what the moral law is, then a sense of duty should become the motive for our actions. Finally our actions should be compelled by doing what is morally right; which is considered doing what we can ...

The opinions of Mill and Kant

Mill’s utilitarianism on Kant and Baxter’s argumentsIn John Stuart Mill’s arguments for utilitarianism, it can be observed that his concept of that which is â€Å"good† corresponds to the maximization of utility, or the promotion of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Further, Mill maintains that right actions are those that primarily promote happiness while on the other hand actions that result to the reverse of happiness are wrong actions.At this point, it should be noted that Mill is arguing for the centrality of a form of consequentialism in his conception of actions and their resulting moral worth. That is, the moral worth or value of the actions of man can be assessed through the very consequences that they give rise to.As human conduct is essentially directed by the quest for happiness or utility, Mill elaborates further that the very directive of men to acquire happiness does not refer to individual happiness or the happiness of each pe rson taken singularly but rather to the collective happiness or the happiness for the greatest number of people. Among the numerous possible manifestations of such happiness that may be perceived, he further argues that the greatest happiness is to be sought after in connection to the greatest number of individuals. From this point, we are to analyze the arguments raised by Immanuel Kant and William Baxter on the aspect of rational agents juxtaposed with the issue of pollution.Both Kant and Baxter resort to the claim that men as rational agents should occupy the central role in ethical considerations. Prior to Baxter, Kant has already maintained that human beings, as agents imbued with and the capacity to reason, should not be treated as the means to possible or given ends. Rather what Kant strongly proposes is that human beings should be considered as the very ends themselves in the course of the actions of every individual. On the other hand, Baxter strongly argues in line with th e Kantian prescription for the acts of man. That is, man’s actions should be that which is what one ought to do.Mill will most likely tell us that Baxter’s conclusions do not eventually promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people in the immediate consequences of man’s actions towards the environment. Mill’s utilitarian principles will maintain that Baxter’s conclusions on the scope of environmental ethics merely prescribe what men ought to do.This prescription, when applied to several environmental issues such as man’s hunting for rare animals for the therapeutic values of their body parts, will most likely condemn the given example and other related instances. However, Mill will argue that, since the gathering of the body parts of such a rare animal will most likely contribute to the betterment and eventual happiness of the greatest number of human beings, the act in itself is a right act. The apparent consequences of s uch an action are deemed with the greatest amount of merit in classifying such action as morally right.For the most part, Mill might have instead argued for the claim that even if pollution becomes a result of the actions of man towards his environment, these same actions should be taken if it promotes the greatest degree of happiness for the greatest number of individuals as its consequence.Mill’s arguments cannot in any way directly support and uphold the ethical guidelines set forth by both Kant and Baxter in seeking the proper conduct for the status quo of the environment.Mill’s utilitarianism on Carr’s â€Å"Is Business Bluffing Ethical?†One essential feature of the utilitarian ethical doctrine is that its moral point of view rests firmly on the consequences of the actions made. That is, an action is then to be categorized as either good or bad depending on the consequence or result of the action intended. However, what differentiates the utilitarian principles from other ethical or moral tenet is that the former further qualifies the outcome of the actions as good in terms of maximum benefits conferred by the deed.In a sense, a good action, then, is one which has maximized benefits or advantages not to oneself but, more importantly, to the most number of individuals as well in the end. Thus, in essence, such doctrine of utilitarianism can be briefly summarized as one that seeks to establish â€Å"the greatest good for the greatest number.In adopting the principles being set forth by utilitarianism one is inclined to embrace the belief that the welfare of the majority is being taken with utmost concern and that, parallel to such aspect of utilitarianism, the greatest happiness or the benefit of the most number of people is seen as fitting enough to further accept the ethical theory of utilitarianism. The relative consequences in adopting these principles highlight a connection to the modern world inasmuch as the welfare of the majority rather than the individual is deemed to outweigh personal motives.Thus, the extent of Mill’s conception of the utilitarian doctrine will firmly hold that business bluffing is ethical so long as it promotes the good of the majority through the greatest good such an action is able to produce.For instance, when company executives are tasked to manage dealings or negotiations with fellow executives, customers, government authorities, labor groups, or the department heads of the same company the executives work in, they can resort to many forms of deception. The act of deceiving these â€Å"other† people in terms of its moral value can be analyzed through the apparent consequences such a conduct is able to make materialize.Especially in cases wherein the fate of the whole company or the status of the entire structure of the line of laborers is at stake, business bluffing is deemed right if and only if it is able to sustain the welfare of the general members of the company as its immediate consequence.Or even in the smallest of the departments in a business establishment, the relative gains of that small unit when taken as a whole should be reason enough, at least in Mill’s utilitarian approach, to pursue actions that will ensure the greatest gains for the greatest number in that department. These actions, in turn, are qualified as ethical and, hence, right under the utilitarian perspective as far as Carr’s notion on the extent of cases where the business â€Å"player† resorts to bluffing is concerned.On the other hand, the extent in which Mill will contradict Carr’s proposals for deception rests on the situation wherein bluffing does not promote the general welfare but instead advances the personal aims of the executive. In such cases, even if there are positive consequences for the businessman, the fact that the relative gains of the businessman for his own goes against the utilitarian principle of the maximizati on of the good. It ignores the crucial part of utilitarianism that prescribes actions which ensures the furtherance of the welfare of the majority.Thus, such an instance is essentially unethical inasmuch as it is not right as far as the tenets of utilitarianism are concerned.Kant’s ethical theory on DeJardins and Duska’s â€Å"Drug Testing in Employment†In order to analyze DeJardins and Duska’s claims in the article, an understanding of Kantian ethics should first be noted. Kantian ethics can be roughly started with the presumption that if we are to strictly follow the assertion that the goal of the lives of men is the attainment of happiness in general, then every individual will most likely be inclined to seek personal gratification so as to arrive at happiness.Nevertheless, the attainment of happiness is not entirely within the human capacity and that its actuality can be interpreted as a matter of chance that depends primarily on the varying capacitie s of man. No universal assurance on the attainment of happiness can then be seen. Consequently, by trying to remove cynicism and nihilism and by allowing the ethical norms of man to occupy the actions of all, it is necessary for these ethical doctrines to be unconditional such that there should be no exceptions and universal in the sense that these tenets should be applicable to every human being.Kant proceeds with his idea of the good will by defining it as a will that operates for the sake of duty and as a â€Å"good-in-itself†. For the most part, the concept of duty is central to the ethical precepts of Kant which he regards crucial by considering the difference that dwell between actions in accordance with duty and actions performed for the sake of duty. For Kant, the latter phrase is the only one that bears moral worth implying a greater moral worth in man’s actions that result from a person’s greater disinclination to act merely for the sake of duty. That is, if a person is motivated to do a certain act simply because one is entirely inclined to do such an act, then the act itself is considered to be bereft of moral worth.Duty for Kant is the inevitability or necessity of functioning out of a strict observation for laws that are universal. Consequently, the worth or value of the action done by the individual in terms of moral precepts is essentially drawn from the intention of the action thereby stressing the content of the actions in terms of intent as significant. This content can be further expressed in two manners. The first states that there are maxims or imperatives that stipulate that there are acts based on the desires of the individual. This is what Kant calls the hypothetical imperative. On the other hand, those which are based on reason and not merely dependent on one’s desires belong to the categorical imperative. The latter type deals with what ought to be done.All these can be roughly transposed and summarized in to Kant’s conception of the practical imperative that claims that one ought to act to treat human beings as ends in themselves and never merely as a means to any given end, whether the individual is the self or another person.Thus, in line with the arguments proposed by the authors of Drug testing in Employment, Kant will very well argue that drug testing among employees in companies is unethical for the reason that it treats the employees as mere objects or means in achieving the ends of set forth by the company. The delicate private information that are to be obtained from the drug tests, moreover, gives rise to the possibility that these information can be manipulated for sinister ploys even if the protection of these information is given due recognition.Moreover, as the authors of the article suggest, drug use is not always job relevant. If this is the case, then information concerning drug use is not relevant as well hence leading to the observation that drug tests are i rrelevant and that these only impair the centrality of man as the end for every action.The reason to these claims rests on two crucial aspects. First is that the practical imperative will not allow the treatment of the employees as schemes for the purpose of the upkeep of the employment status of the employer or of the company. Second is that drug testing undermines the rights of the employee thus, relegating our attention back to the first reason, undermining as well their existence as human beings and rational agents.ReferenceMill, J. S. (1863). What Utilitarianism Is. In Utilitarianism (pp. 4-16).